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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Donald Britton contends the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress.
Since the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to justify immediately deviating from the
mission of the traffic stop, he unlawfully prolonged the detention by conducting a DUI
investigation instead of completing the mission of the traffic stop. As such, this Court should
reverse the order denying the motion to suppress.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
At approximately eight in the morning, Officer Justin Klitch saw a series of cars drive
past him on the interstate. (See Exhibit 1, ~8:02: 16.) 1 He looked specifically at Mr. Britton's
pickup within that group of cars because he believed it had an excessively loud muffler. 2
(Tr., p.114, Ls.8-19.) 3 As he looked, he saw that Mr. Britton was not wearing a seatbelt, and so,
"I was focused on him to go stop him" once he saw "that violation." 4 (Tr., p.114, Ls.11-15.)

1

Where applicable, citations to the video exhibit will identify the relevant time stamp on the
video. If quotations to the video are necessary, they are reproduced to the best of appellate
counsel's ability.
2
Officer Klitch testified he did not believe there was any particular standard against which to
determine whether a muffler is excessively loud. (Tr., p.79, L.12 - p.80, L.6.) He was mistaken
in that regard, as the relevant statute defines excessive muffler sound as sound in excess of
ninety-two decibels. LC. §§ 49-937, -106(8). As such, the stop could not be justified based on
Officer Klitch's estimate that the muffler was too loud. Compare State v. McCarthy, 133 Idaho
119, 125 (Ct. App. 1999) (holding an officer cannot stop a person based on his estimation the
person was speeding when the officer did not know what the speed limit actually was).
3
Citations to the transcript refer to the electronic document entitled "Transcript Appeal Volume
1.pdf" As the transcripts of each hearing in that file are independently numbered, citations
thereto will use the electronic page number instead.
4
The applicable statute is clear that an officer cannot initiate a traffic stop based on the failure to
wear a seat belt. LC. § 49-673(5).

1

The video shows the officer begin to accelerate back on to the interstate at that time.

(See

Exhibit 1, ~8:02:16.)
While he was accelerating toward Mr. Britton's pickup, Officer Klitch testified that,
despite the fact that other cars were moving in between him and Mr. Britton' s pickup, he was
able to see Mr. Britton signal for less than the required five seconds before changing lanes. (See
Tr., p.114, L.5 - p.115, L.12; compare Exhibit 1, ~8:02:16; see also R., p.132 (the district court
finding the officer's testimony on this point to be credible).) He moved in behind Mr. Britton's
pickup and activated his overhead lights. (Exhibit 1, ~8:02:47.) Mr. Britton immediately began
pulling onto the shoulder and slowed to a stop. (See Exhibit 1, ~8:02:50-8:03:15.)
Mr. Britton was unable to provide his current insurance information, explaining he had
just got the pickup back during a "bad separation" and the paperwork to get his insurance put on
the pickup was still being processed. (Exhibit 1, ~8:04: 15.) During the approximately oneminute long conversation at the pickup's window, Officer Klitch testified he noticed two things that Mr. Britton's eyes were bloodshot, glassy, and "slightly dilated," and that his movements
were exaggerated and fidgety. (Tr., p.14, Ls.9-12.) 5 At the hearing on the motion to suppress,
Officer Klitch added the description that Mr. Britton's actions were similar to someone who is
"tweaking." (Tr., p.97, Ls.12-21.) The officer explained these behaviors were most visible in
the way Mr. Britton was constantly moving and reaching around with his arms during the walkand-turn test. (Tr., p.97, L.25 - p.98, L.5; but see Exhibit 1, ~8: 13:55-8: 15:31 (the walk-and-turn
portion of the video, showing Mr. Britton mostly with his hands at his sides, except when they
went out to maintain balance).)

5

At the motion to suppress hearing, the district court took judicial notice of Officer Klitch's
testimony at the preliminary hearing. (Tr., p.68, L.15 - p.69, L.5.)
2

Based on those observations, he decided to order Mr. Britton out of the car and directed
him to perform the modified Romberg field sobriety test. (Tr., p.111, Ls.3-7; Tr., p.111, Ls.8-18
(the officer describing the Romberg test).) Officer Klitch noted that Mr. Britton's estimation of
the thirty seconds in that test was fast (only twenty-two seconds), and that he swayed and his
eyelids tremored during the test. (Tr., p.24, Ls.10-12.) Nevertheless, Officer Klitch explained he
did not cite Mr. Britton for DUI because he "was not impaired" and he had "passed field sobriety
tests."6 (Tr., p.20, L.23 - p.21, L.4.)
Nevertheless, after conducting the Romberg test, Officer Klitch proceeded to question
Mr. Britton about whether he had used drugs that day, and he told Mr. Britton he was going to
have a drug dog come and sniff his car. (Tr., p.111, L.19 - p.112, L.6.) In response, Mr. Britton
admitted there was a pipe in his car which he had used to smoke methamphetamine the day
before. (See Tr., p.5, Ls.12-17; p.112, Ls.7-11.) Officer Klitch then had Mr. Britton perform
three other field sobriety tests (horizontal gaze, walk-and-tum, and one-leg stand), which he also
passed. (See Exhibit 1, ~8:12:10; Tr., p.21, Ls.1-4.)
Officer Klitch and another officer, who arrived during the field sobriety tests (see Exhibit
1, ~8:13;55), proceeded to search Mr. Britton's pickup. (See generally Exhibit 1, ~8:20:57.)
Inside, they found the pipe as well as a baggie with what they suspected was methamphetamine.
(Tr., p.5, L.23 - p.6, L.10) The State ultimately charged Mr. Britton with possession of a

6

At the preliminary hearing, however, Officer Klitch had testified the Romberg test is not truly a
"pass/fail" test, just that it potentially reveals indicators that the person is currently under the
influence ofa stimulant. (See Tr., p.31, Ls.18-23.) Thus, his explanation that he did not cite
Mr. Britton with DUI because he "passed field sobriety tests" necessarily means the facts he
observed during the Romberg test did not demonstrate Mr. Britton was currently impaired by a
stimulant.

3

controlled substance, possession of paraphernalia, as well as driving without msurance.
(R., pp.58-59.)
Mr. Britton filed a motion to suppress all the evidence found in his case, arguing, inter
alia, that Officer Klitch deviated from the mission of the traffic stop and unlawfully prolonged

the detention when he ordered Mr. Britton out of the car to perform the Romberg test without
reasonable suspicion to justify a DUI investigation. 7 (R., pp.79-80, 92-102; Tr., p.122, Ls.5-12.)
The district court found that the officer had reasonable suspicion, given his training and
experience, based on his observations that Mr. Britton "had glassy, bloodshot eyes and slightly
dilated pupils. Further [Mr. Britton's] movements were 'exaggerated,' as if he was 'tweaking,'
and was described by Sgt. Klitch as 'fidgety."' (R., p.134.) As such, it denied the motion to
suppress in that regard. (R., pp.133-35.)
Thereafter, Mr. Britton entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to challenge
the decision on his motion to suppress. (Tr., p.153, Ls.8-16; R., p.142.) The district court
subsequently imposed a unified sentence of three years, with one and one-half years fixed, which
it suspended for a two-year period of probation, on the felony conviction and to time served on
the two misdemeanor convictions. (Tr., p.171, Ls.5-9; p.172, Ls.12-16.) Mr. Britton filed a
notice of appeal timely from that judgment. (R., pp.148, 156.)

7

Though defense counsel also suspected Officer Klitch had received information that
Mr. Britton was in possession of drugs, the officer expressly disavowed that idea. (See Tr., p.9,
Ls.7-19, p.79, Ls.4-11.) In doing so, he disavowed knowledge of any information that would
give rise to a reasonable suspicion that Mr. Britton was currently in possession of drugs (as
opposed to having ingested them) at the time he deviated from the mission of the stop.
4

ISSUE
Whether the district court erred when it denied Mr. Britton's motion to suppress because the
officer did not have reasonable suspicion to justify deviated from the mission of the traffic stop.

5

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Britton's Motion To Suppress Because The Officer
Did Not Have Reasonable Suspicion To Justify Deviated From The Mission Of The Traffic Stop

A.

Standard Of Review
The appellate courts use a bifurcated standard when reviewing the denial of a motion to

suppress - they will accept the trial court's factual fmdings if they are not clearly erroneous, but
will freely review the trial court's application of constitutional principles to those facts. State v.

Linze, 161 Idaho 605, 607 (2016).
When an officer stops a vehicle for a traffic violation, the Fourth Amendment requires
that detention last no longer than the time it takes, or reasonably should have taken, to complete
the mission of the traffic stop. Rodriguez v. United States,_ U.S. _ _ , 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614
(2015). As such, the officer may conduct other, unrelated checks during a traffic stop without
additional reasonable suspicion only if those other tasks do not prolong the time it takes, or
should have taken, to complete the mission of the traffic stop. Id. However, if the deviation
increases the time the stop should have taken, effectively, a new seizure has occurred. Linze, 161
Idaho at 609.

The Fourth Amendment requires that new seizure be justified by its own

reasonable suspicion; it "cannot piggy-back on the reasonableness of the original seizure." Id.
"Whether an officer possessed reasonable suspicion is evaluated based on the totality of
the circumstances known to the officer at or before the time of the stop." State v. Bishop, 146
Idaho 804, 811 (2009). Thus, at the time Officer Klitch deviated from the mission of the traffic
stop to conduct a DUI investigation, he must have been aware of circumstances giving rise to a
reasonable suspicion that Mr. Britton was driving under the influence, or else, that detention
violated the Fourth Amendment. See Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1614; Linze, 161 Idaho at 609.

6

B.

The Totality Of The Circumstances Observed By Officer Klitch Did Not Create A
Reasonable Suspicion To Justify Immediately Deviating From The Mission Of The
Traffic Stop And Conduct A DUI Investigation Instead
Officer Klitch deviated from the mission of the traffic stop almost immediately, starting a

DUI investigation with the Romberg test after only approximately one minute of talking to
Mr. Britton. (See generally Exhibit 1.) The district court pointed to only two facts which it felt
gave rise to a reasonable suspicion to justify doing so - that Mr. Britton' s eyes were bloodshot,
glassy, and slightly dilated; and that his movements were exaggerated and fidgety, as if he were
"tweaking. " 8 (R., pp.134-3 5.) Because those two facts do not give rise to a reasonable suspicion
that under the totality of the circumstances that Mr. Britton was driving under the influence, that
conclusion was in error.
Notably, the condition of a person's eyes - that they are bloodshot, glassy, or dilated
(particularly only "slightly dilated") -cannot, by itself, establish reasonable suspicion of drug or

8

Notably, although the officer had mentioned the fact (Tr., p.87, Ls.6-12), the district court did
not include the manner in which Mr. Britton slowed to a stop as contributing to the finding of
reasonable suspicion. (See generally R., pp.133-35.) That is not surprising because the video
exhibit actually indicates a little time was needed to safely decelerate from highway speeds and
come to a stop on the side of the interstate highway. (See Exhibit 1, ~8:02:50-8:03:15 (showing
Mr. Britton's brake lights and the indicator for the officer's brakes (indicator 6 on the video
player display) were both on during the twenty seconds or so between the time Mr. Britton
started to brake on the shoulder and coming to a complete stop).)
In fact, the video shows that none of the other cars on the road had to break or swerve to
avoid Mr. Britton's pickup, either as he changed lanes or pulled over. (See Exhibit 1, ~8:02:16.)
As such, the video shows there was no pattern of erratic or unsafe driving that might provide
reasonable suspicion of impaired driving. Compare State v. Anderson, 154 Idaho 703, 704
(2012) (describing erratic driving behavior which supported an initial traffic stop as "nearly
sidewip[ ing] another vehicle attempting to pass on the right, forcing the passing vehicle to
swerve to avoid collision"); cf State v. Neal, 159 Idaho 439, 444 (2015) (holding that two
instances of driving on the fog line did not create a driving pattern that gave rise to stop the car
and investigate a potential DUI, and comparing to, inter alia, United States v. Wendfeldt, 58
F.Supp.3d 1124 1130 (D.Nev. 2014), in which the district court had held that, despite touching
the fog line several times, "'he was not speeding or driving erratically in any way, and his
driving posed no danger to any other motorists"').

7

alcohol use. State v. Perez-Jungo, 156 Idaho 609, 616 (Ct. App. 2014); State v. Grigg, 149
Idaho 361, 364 (Ct. App. 2010). Rather, it is only when that fact appears within a constellation
of other facts does the image of drug or alcohol impairment reasonably emerge. Id.
The traditional constellation in that regard involves a person with bloodshot, glassy,
and/or dilated eyes, who has also been observed driving erratically, is slurring their speech, and
smells of alcoholic beverages. See, e.g., State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302-03 (2007), overruled
on other grounds; Thompson v. State, 138 Idaho 512, 515 (Ct. App. 2003); State v. Armbruster,
117 Idaho 19, 19 (Ct. App. 1989). This case is a far cry from that traditional constellation.
There was no indication Mr. Britton was slurring his words. (See generally R., Tr., Exhibit 1.)
There was also no observed pattern of erratic driving. (See note 4, supra.) Nor was there any
indication the officer smelled the odor of alcoholic beverages or other drugs (such as burnt
marijuana, for example). (See generally R., Tr.)
The totality of the circumstances in this case also do not create any other pattern in that
regard. Notably, the officer admitted he looked for, but did not see any signs of recent ingestion
on Mr. Britton, such as injection marks, raised taste buds, or white coating on the tongue.
(Tr., p.109, L.9 - p.110, L.6.) He also admitted the way Mr. Britton was answering his questions
did not raise his suspicions, as Mr. Britton was not giving incorrect answers, forgetting answers,
or repeating answers. (See Tr., p.110, L.12 - p.111, L.2.) The video also shows Mr. Britton did
not appear to have trouble maintaining his balance as he got out of the pickup. Compare State v.
Mace, 133 Idaho 903, 905 (Ct. App. 2000) (pointing to the defendant’s poor balance as a fact
evidencing his intoxication). In fact, Mr. Britton was able to react quickly when the officer said
“Hey, watch your dog!” to keep it from jumping out of the pickup. (See Exhibit 1, ~8:05:00.)
Without any of those points, it is difficult indeed to draw a constellation showing reasonable

8

suspicion of impairment in this case. Compare Perez-Jungo, 156 Idaho at 616 (holding that the
fact the defendant was parked in a remote area without viable explanation and had pro-drug
iconography in the car, along with him having bloodshot, glassy eyes, gave rise to a reasonable
suspicion); Grigg, 149 Idaho at 364 (holding that reddened conjunctiva and eyelid tremors, along
with bloodshot and glassy eyes, gave rise to a reasonable suspicion). 9
That conclusion remains the same even in light of the other fact to which the district court
pointed - Mr. Britton' s fidgety, exaggerated, "tweaking" movements.

That fact, like the

condition of a person's eyes, is actually "of limited significance in establishing the presence of
reasonable suspicion because it is common for people to exhibit signs of nervousness when
confronted with law enforcement regardless of criminal activity." State v. Neal, 159 Idaho 919,
924 (Ct. App. 2016) (upholding the district court's determination that behaviors such as
bouncing a leg or speaking quickly or rapidly are consistent with signs of nervousness and do not
give rise to a reasonable suspicion of driving under the influence of a stimulant). In other words,
there needs to be something connecting such behaviors with criminal conduct, rather than just
nervousness, before they can carry any sort of significant value within the totality of the
circumstances. See State v. Kelley, 160 Idaho 761, 762-63 (Ct. App. 2016) (holding there was no
reasonable suspicion in that case because the officer had not testified to any facts which
connected the person's nervous behaviors - lack of eye contact, trembling, and a pulsing carotid
artery- to potential criminal activity).

9

In this case, Officer Klitch did observe eye tremors, but admitted he only saw them during the
Romberg test. (See Tr., p.104, Ls.2-4.) Therefore, that fact cannot contribute to the
determination of whether he had reasonable suspicion to prolong the detention because it was not
a fact known at the time the detention was prolonged. See, e.g., Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811.

9

Here, as in Kelley, Mr. Britton’s behaviors were not inherently indicative of criminal
conduct, as opposed to simply nervous behavior. In fact, the totality of the circumstances,
particularly those surrounding Mr. Britton’s dog, disperses any such connection. (See Tr., p.99,
Ls.23-25 (defense counsel asking the officer about this point).) Although Officer Klitch said he
did not remember Mr. Britton being overly concerned about his dog, (Tr., p.100, Ls.1-7), the
video still shows the officer was aware of the dog during the initial minute of the encounter and
felt it was necessary to tell Mr. Britton: “Why don’t you very carefully step out so your dog
doesn’t jump out,” and, as he got out, “Hey, watch your dog!” (Exhibit 1, ~8:04:50.) The
inference from those two comments is that, though Mr. Britton was not overly concerned about
the dog doing something unexpected, he still had to dedicate some of his attention to his dog
during the initial part of the encounter. As such, any oddity in Mr. Britton’s movements during
the initial part of the encounter could be attributed to that split in his focus, and thus, was less
indicative of potential criminal conduct, and so, was of less value in finding reasonable
suspicion, even when viewed alongside the condition of Mr. Britton’s eyes. Compare Kelley,
160 Idaho at 763; see also Perez-Jungo, 156 Idaho at 616 (explaining that, even when facts may
not be sufficient to independently give rise to a reasonable suspicion, they may still did so when
viewed together).
When viewed in the totality of the circumstances of this stop, those two facts of
inherently-limited value, even taken together, do not show a reasonable suspicion to justify a
DUI investigation, particularly when so many other, more concrete signs of impairment were
demonstrably absent from the totality. Rather, the officer’s attempt to extrapolate a pattern from
only two data points of inherently-limited value is the very definition of a hunch. A hunch
cannot base a prolonged detention. See Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1615; Linze, 161 Idaho at 609.

10

As such, the district court erred by denying Mr. Britton's motion to suppress the evidence found
during that unlawfully-prolonged detention.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Britton respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order of
judgment and commitment and reverse the order which denied his motion to suppress.
DATED this 18th day of September, 2019.

I sf Brian R. Dickson
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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